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STAKEHOLDER PREFERENCES FOR MOBILE PAYMENT
SECURITY PLATFORMS: UNDERSTANDING TRADE-OFFS
BETWEEN SIM, EMBEDDED AND CLOUD-BASED SECURE
ELEMENTS
Mark de Reuver, Sebastiaan Blok, Harry Bouwman
Delft University of Technology, Faculty Technology Policy & Management
g.a.dereuver@tudelft.nl

Abstract
Authentication and identification for mobile payment transactions is typically provided by the secure
element. While the SIM-card has long been the only option for locating the secure element, recently
alternatives emerged like embedding the secure element into the device or offering it through the
cloud. This paper elicits factors that influence stakeholder preferences for these three technical
options. Exploratory interviews suggest a wide range of decision-making factors. Our results show
that besides the basic security and performance traits of the technical options, other factors can only
be understood when framing based on concepts of multisided platforms. The case of secure elements
for mobile payments represents a highly complex illustration of platform competition that takes place
on three different levels of the technical architecture.
Keywords: Mobile payment, multi-sided platforms, secure element, SIM-card
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Introduction

In order to provide adequate security and prevent fraud, mobile payment solutions require a means to
authenticate and identify the user. One way of doing so is storing user credentials into what is typically
called a secure element. Most pilots on mobile payment use the SIM card as a secure element. The
SIM, in the form of a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) can take over functions of plastic
smartcards since it is able to hold a number of applications (Park, Kim, & Kim, 2008). Hence, the SIM
card can be used for services such as ID cards, bank cards, bus tickets or even a security element that
confirms a person’s identity online without the need to introduce new hardware elements in the mobile
handset (Mantoro & Milišić, 2010; Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009). There are, however, technical
alternatives. The embedded SE is a hardware module that is soldered onto the mobile handset and
offers the same level of security as the SIM (Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009). In a cloud-based solution
the credentials are stored in the cloud environment of the service provider rather than on a hardware
module (Pannifer, Clark, & Birch, 2014). Both solutions are capable of providing mobile
authentication and identification services. As such, stakeholders currently face three different options
for where to locate the secure element.
The decision where to locate the secure element goes beyond the mere technological and security traits
of the three aforementioned options. Acceptance by consumers is an important issue as mobile
payment solutions will not reach mass market without a critical mass of consumers (Dahlberg,
Bouwman, Cerpa, & Guo, 2015; Dahlberg, Mallat, Ondrus, & Zmijewska, 2008) Similarly,
standardization and reach are important conditions to reach a critical mass. In addition, collaboration
issues between telecom operators and banks have been recognized as an important hurdle for mobile
payment solutions (de Reuver, Verschuur, Nikayin, Cerpa, & Bouwman, 2014), hence the impact on
interdependencies between actors also needs to be taken into account. Combined with the dynamics of
rapidly emerging disruptive technologies, such as cloud-based or hybrid authentication mechanisms,
stakeholders face a highly complex decision-making problem.
This paper attempts to understand the multifaceted nature of platform competition over the secure
element for mobile payment. Specifically, we explore stakeholder preferences on whether to use the
SIM card or alternative technologies for hosting the secure element. Given the complex multifaceted
nature of the case, we take an exploratory approach and interview banks, telecom operators and
experts.
Our paper contributes to the practical problem of where to locate the secure element for mobile
payment (see also Ondrus et al 2015). Theoretically, we explore how notions of platform competition
and network effects become manifest when platforms compete on different levels of the technical
architecture. In addition, we compare the explanatory power of platform concepts as compared to the
security and performance traits of the technologies.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background on mobile payment, authentication
and identification technologies as well as the three main options for locating the secure element.
Section 3 details the method of the study, followed by the results in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
significance of the results along the concepts of platform competition. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Background

2.1

Mobile payment

Mobile payment can be defined as the use of a mobile device to conduct payment by connecting to a
server, perform authentication and authorization, make a payment, initiate accounting and finally
confirm the completed transaction (Antovski & Gusev, 2003; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Ding & Hampe,

2003). In this paper, we focus on proximity payments rather than remote payments. Mobile payments
may be classified into those based on smart card schemes and those based on mobile smart devices
(Ondrus & Pigneur, 2006). In practice this implies payments at point of sales as well as for instance
transactions for public transport or access services, where face-to-face contact between buyer and
seller is not necessary.
Various players are looking to dominate the advanced mobile payment market, including telecom
operators, banks, credit card providers, payment providers and actors like Apple and Google (Ondrus
& Lyytinen, 2011). Currently, market expectations are rising again thanks to increased penetration of
Near Field Communication (NFC) on mobile phones (Juntunen, Tuunainen, & Luukkainen, 2012).
NFC-enabled mobile payment uses the antenna, NFC controller and secure element located in the
phone. The secure element can be integrated in the device (embedded), in the SIM card or in a microSD memory card. Consumers conduct payments by holding the phone in front of an NFC-enabled
payment terminal. Several service models exist for mobile payment which involve different actors
(Chaix /& Torre, 2012; Ondrus & Pigneur, 2006; Pousttchi, Schiessler, & Wiedemann, 2009).
However, most models assume a trusted service manager (TSM) that mediates between banks,
telecom operators, and the mobile payment service provider. The TSM provides the generic
functionality for service deployment and authentication. The TSM can be a bank, telecom operator,
payment service provider or independent organization. A TSM can be centralized or split e.g. a part is
of the functionality is offered by the service provider and another part by the telecom operator. If a
telecom operator is involved, the secure element of the TSM can be placed on the SIM card of the
phone.

2.2

Authentication through secure element

Authentication mechanisms control whether one is granted access. In general, three ways for
authentication exist (Stamp, 2011): Something a person knows (e.g. password); Something a person
has (e.g. smart card); Something a person is (e.g. biometrics). Many authentication systems combine
two methods, for instance payment cards require presenting the card (i.e., something a person has) and
a PIN (i.e., something a person has).
A secure element (SE) combines these means partly by integrating hardware, software, interfaces and
protocols in a mobile handset for secure storage (Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009). SE should provide
secure memory, cryptographic functions and a secure environment for execution (Madlmayr et al.,
2007). When multiple applications are stored on the SE, they must be protected from each other and
the applications should only be managed by authorized parties (Madlmayr et al., 2007).

2.3

Technology options for secure element

In this paper, we consider the three main technology options for providing a secure element.1 A first
option for locating the secure element is the SIM card, as being controlled by the mobile network
operator. As SIM cards are already used to identify and authenticate mobile devices to the operator
network, they could be used for hosting an SE for mobile payment as well. SIM cards can be used to
identify and authenticate subscribers, store data and run and store applications. Reported advantages of
the SIM card for hosting the SE include strong cryptographic calculation power and security (Chen,
Mayes, Lien, & Chiu, 2011). SIM cards have been designed to be secure and tamper resistant, provide
encryption capabilities for securely storing private keys and guarded by PIN and PUK codes with
limited attempts (Abbott & Practical, 2002). The next generation SIM cards (referred to as Universal

1

Although theoretically possible, in this paper we will not consider the micro-SD card option for storing the SE,
as most handsets no longer have a slot for inserting a micro-SD card.

Integrated Circuit Card or UICC) can store multiple applications from both the operator and third
parties. The operating system on the card prevents the applications from accessing or sharing data
between them (Alimi & Pasquet, 2009). The UICC can thus be safely used for other applications such
as mobile payment, loyalty cards or point-of sales transactions.
A second option is to use an embedded SE, which refers to a tamper resistant module that is soldered
onto the mobile handset and offers the same level of security as the SIM (Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009).
Similar as for the SIM-based scenario, the entire application is stored on the element. The chip is
embedded within the device during the manufacturing phase and must be personalized after the device
is delivered to the user. As the SE is soldered onto the handset in cannot be used in a different
handset. This means that the user must personalize his handset every time he purchases a new one. An
example of a mobile handset with an embedded SE is Apple’s iPhone.
A third option is to virtualize the SE into a cloud system. Google recently introduced Host Card
Emulation (HCE) for the Android OS in which a cloud based solution can be used rather than a
physical SE in the mobile handset. In this case the application is held within the operating system of
the mobile phone which is called the “host” (Pannifer et al., 2014). With a cloud solution the
credentials to exchange with the contact point can be stored in the cloud owned by the SP. The handset
must connect to the cloud by making use of the internet after which handset will receive keys that
allow using the application at a contact point. These keys are provided via an internet connection and
are often provided in a limited amount with a limited validity period.
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Method

We explore preferences for SIM, embedded and cloud-based SE through interviews with stakeholders
in the Dutch mobile payment industry. The main goal of the interviews is to elicit which factors
influence their preferences for one of the three options. Interviewees must be affiliated with a
stakeholder in the mobile payment industry, i.e. bank, telecom operator, service provider or
consultancy firm. Interviewees must at least have a working experience of a couple years within the
industry. In addition, we strived for respondents with technical as well as business expertise. Interview
candidates were sourced through the personal network of the authors as well as the client network of a
prominent mobile payment security firm, followed by a snowballing approach. An overview of
interviewees is provided in Table 1.
The interviews are based on a semi-structured approach (Table 2). As the research focuses on an
industry that is subjected to change new insights might arise that have not been addressed during desk
research. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Respondents received a brief introduction of
the study prior to the interview. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded. We analyzed
transcripts by first selecting relevant quotations on preferences for SIM versus embedded or cloudbased secure elements. Coding was initial based on open and selective coding (Glaser & Strauss,
2009), making use of clustering techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Through open coding, we
assigned different labels to those quotations. Next, we clustered the codes into themes through an
inductive approach.

Actor role
Telecom
operators
Banks

Code
MNO1
MNO2
BA1
BA2
BA3
BA4
IE1
IE2
IE3
IE4
IE5
IE6

Experts

Job description
Program manager mobile commerce and payment
Business development manager mobile commerce
Senior product manager
Cards and online payments manager
Senior product manager electronic commerce
Former program director mobile payment platform
Managing consultant identity management
Consultant
Managing partner
Card scheme manager
Business developer
Associate professor specialized in mobile payment

Table 1.

Interviewees

Topic
SIM in general

Technical
alternatives for
locating the SE

Question
What is your opinion on the function of the SIM in regard to mobile authentication and
identification services?
What do you find interesting markets to target with mobile authentication and identification
services and why?
Is mobile payment interesting for your company to offer mobile authentication and
identification services in regard to market size, potential revenue and needed security?
What do you see as requirements when offering mobile authentication and identification
services to mobile payment?
What added-value can the SIM provide to your company in regard to mobile authentication
and identification services?
What technical alternatives would you consider when offering authentication services and
why?
What technical solution would have you preference and why?
Why not another solution?
What are limitations of the SIM when offering authentication and identification services on a
business and organizational level?
Do you see the SIM as a long-term solution for mobile authentication and identification
services?
What are external (technical, organizational, business, social acceptance) factors that may
influence the SIM for authentication?

Table 2.

Interview question list

Application
markets

It is important to be aware of the role and interests of respondents. A mobile operator will, for
instance, have preference for a SIM-based solution, as it controls and owns this resource. So, when
comparing the different alternatives, it is key that the background of the respondent is taken into
account, as it could lead to a biased view. This is an important reason for interviewing experts that
have a different, often more neutral background. Based on the interviews, a comparison between the
alternatives has been made to generate an overview of the unique characteristics of SE solutions.
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Results

First, interviewees suggest a number of technology-related factors that influence their preferences on
where to locate the secure elements. Regarding security issues, several interviewees argue that
hardware components, like the SIM, are generally more secure than software components, like cloudbased SE [BA2, BA3, IE4]. Hardware components are generally more difficult to alter or to infect

with malware. In addition, the process of issuing SIM cards reduces risk of fraud since consumers
have to identify themselves face-to-face. While security is an important issue, some bank
representatives questioned whether micropayments of fewer than ten euros actually require strong
security in the first place.
Regarding performance issues, SIM cards are superior to embedded and cloud-based solutions as they
work even without Internet connectivity or battery. Interviewees also expect SIM-based solutions to
perform better since they would be more mature than cloud-based solutions. A downside is that SIM
cards have insufficient memory for storing applications, requiring a so-called SIM swap, i.e.
replacement with UICCs. Interviewees also argued that upgrading hardware is generally more difficult
than software.
For any mobile payment solution, broad acceptance from consumers as well as merchants is required.
On the one hand, consumer acceptance of SIM-based SE might be higher since consumers will also be
able to switch to another device manufacturer without having to change their mobile payment
subscription. On the other hand, cloud-based solutions might lead to more control for the consumer
and customer lock-in will be limited. With cloud-based solutions a consumer can change more easily
from handset or phone subscription without the need to go through a difficult provisioning process.
Next, to that a cloud-based solution will offer the possibility to facilitate a payment application over
multiple machines [IE2], which could be relevant if for instance tablets, smart watches or smart car
solutions would be used for payments. One of the experts said that there is a mismatch between the
life cycle of the handset and authentication means [IE5]. Authentication means are used over a longer
period than a handset or a phone subscription. For example, the expert [IE5] commented that a credit
card has a validity of a number of years while most phone subscriptions are only valid for one or two
years.
SIM-based solutions provide high reach and installed base since they work in any mobile phone
regardless device brand or operating system. In contrast, relying on embedded SE implies
fragmentation of the market due to the variety of handsets [MNO1, MNO2, BA2, BA3, IE1, IE4, IE3].
A representative of a bank mention, that “the embedded SE differs per supplier and per handset. The
embedded SE can even differ per version, for instance not all Samsung Galaxy S6 have similar
embedded elements. This means that adjustments to the payment application have to be made per
device. As the SIM is standardized, we see it as an easier solution for mobile payments” [BA3]. As
such, the SIM card is a more standardized solution with a high reach and installed base.
Dependency was another recurrent theme in the interviews. While cloud-based solutions can be hosted
by the service provider or bank in-house, SIM-based solutions imply dependency on operators. One of
the respondents stress that “banks want to stay in control and want limited dependence of other
parties, especially if they come from a different sector [like telecommunications]” [BA2]. Dealing
with multiple operators is required to gain sufficient reach in a country, which creates coordination
issues and complexity. Interviewees did not agree on whether they would rather depend on operators
or on device makers. Embedded SE solutions imply dependency on device makers, and interviewees
did not agree whether they would prefer to be dependent on operators or on device manufacturers.
Costs are another important issue as margins in the payment industry are low [BA1, BA2 BA3, IE3].
Several respondents argued that SIM based solutions are too expensive or at least have been
overpriced in the past. According to different respondents, the MNOs have overestimated the value of
the SIM, as they wanted their own mobile wallet and a fee per payment transaction [BA1, BA3, BA4].
Other interviewees, especially those from telecom operators, argued that their pricing models have
been reduced dramatically in order to remain competitive with alternative solutions. “We started a new
trend as we have lowered the price of the SIM. We don’t want that our customers base their decision
on costs and therefore we want to offer the SIM for the same price as the costs for a HCE solution.
Next, to that banks will be allowed to issue their own mobile wallet. Banks should really look at what
they find the best technology and we are confident that the SIM scores well on this” [MNO1]. Another
issue that could lead to high costs is that a SIM swap is needed to facilitate authentication services

[MNO1, MNO2, IE6]. Most of the SIMs that are currently deployed in the market cannot meet the
requirements needed to facilitate mobile payments. A SIM swap is an extensive and expensive
process.
A hurdle for using SIM-based SE that may be specific to the context of the research is the lack of trust
in operators. Several bank interviewees argued they no longer trust telecom operators in their
offerings. Telecom operators were generally referred to as difficult to collaborate with and too focused
on short-term profits. Especially since recent collaboration initiatives with telecom operators has
largely failed (e.g. the Travik initiative), banks and service providers had little confidence in renewed
collaboration with operators. Banks focus more on customer retention while MNOs are more sales
driven organizations [BA1]. One expert [IE6] says, “there are many examples of failed attempts of
MNOs to extend their business. MNOs believe in control to create value and this mind-set is a barrier
when entering a new market.” Another argues that “MNOs have overplayed their hand in the past, as
they wanted maximum profit at the expense of the bank’s business model” [BA1, IE2, IE3].
A final observation is that several respondents indicated it is too difficult to make a trade-off between
the SIM card and the two alternatives. They observed that stakeholders are experimenting with all
three options at the moment. One independent expert commented that there are simply not enough
example cases to base a decision upon. Respondents also clearly indicated that they simply expect that
new alternatives will come up and that cloud-based solutions will evolve. As such, most interviewees
from other actors than the operators indicated they are not yet willing to make a choice between the
technologies. Furthermore, the world of mobile payments is changing so fast as new technologies are
introduced to the market that a solution that is implemented now must be seen as short-term as new
technologies are constantly introduced to the market [BA1, BA3].
Findings are summarized in Table 3.
Issue
Security

Advantage of SIM
Hardware is generally more secure than
software2
Lower chance of fraud due to linkage with
person
SIM does not need Internet connectivity or
battery
SIM more mature solution than cloud-based
solutions

Disadvantage of SIM
SIM can get lost or removed from handset
Micropayments might not require such
strong security

Consumer
acceptance

Easier to switch device brands1
SIM is a very personal technology

Reach

SIM works on any device brand, thus
offering higher reach and installed base1
Operators are better organized than hardware
providers
SIM works with any operating system, thus
offering higher reach and installed base2

Less easy to switch operator
Mismatch between lifecycle of handset /
subscription and lifecycle of payment
mechanism
Cloud-based SE works even when switching
operator or device2
SIM solutions only work within one specific
country

Issue

Advantage of SIM

Performance

SIM has insufficient memory to store
applications, unless replaced by UICC
Hardware more difficult to replace and
upgrade than software2

Disadvantage of SIM

Dependency

Operators are more accessible than foreign
device makers

SIM implies dependency on operators
Dealing with multiple operators is too
complex
International operators are difficult to
influence

Costs

SIM becoming less expensive due to threats
of new technologies

SIM too expensive
Business conditions from operators are too
diverse
Banks no longer trust telecom operators
Telecom operators have image of being
difficult to collaborate with
Past collaborations with telecom operators
failed because too expensive and want to
own the wallet brand
Cloud-based solutions may become more
secure in the future2
New alternatives will come up in the future
Too many technologies to make a choice
Banks work on different solutions
Too few actual implementation cases to
judge

Trust

Uncertainties

Table 3.
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Reported pros and cons of SIM based secure element
1
= Only applies to SIM versus embedded SE; 2 = Only applies to SIM versus cloudbased SE

Discussion

As mobile payment technologies are only valuable once adopted by a critical mass of consumers and
of merchants, by their very nature mobile payment technologies exhibit characteristics of multi-sided
platforms (Gawer, 2011). As such, understanding the dynamics and evolution of such multisided
digital platform is already complex in its own right (Tiwana, 2013). We find several factors in our
analysis that can be framed from a multi-sided platform perspective. Consumer acceptance is generally
considered important, including lock-in, switching costs, and flexibility to change handset and
operator brands. Even more important in the interviews anticipated reach, which is required to create
network effects, was speculated about. Respondents clearly indicated they would only accept solutions
that can be used by a majority of users, thus requiring a broad reach of handset brands and operators.
Although these issues are common to platform theory, in this specific case, the three competing
platform technologies are on different levels of the technical architecture: the device itself (i.e.
embedded SE), the operator-controlled part of the device (i.e. SIM), and the cloud (i.e. cloud-based
SE). Understanding the dynamics and preferences for the three competing platform technologies thus
involves different dynamics and interdependencies. Whereas the attractiveness of embedded SE
depends on such things like fragmentation of the device market, the attractiveness of cloud-based SE
depends on the diversity of operating systems. As such, the case of where to locate the secure element
of mobile payment exhibits a rather peculiar case of platform competition, where actors that normally
compete (e.g. telecom operators) have to collaborate (e.g. to offer a standardized SIM-based solution)
and actors that normally collaborate (e.g. telecom operator and device manufacturer) now have to
compete (e.g. by offering competing solutions).
Two major themes emerging from the interview analysis are dependencies of banks and service
providers on operators and the associated lack of trust between parties. From a resource dependence
perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), it is predicted that actors will always try to minimize their
dependence on others in order to limit external control. As such, the preference for cloud-based SE can

be understood since they can, in principle, be hosted in-house by banks and service providers or
outsourced to IT providers that they can control directly. Interestingly, interviewed banks especially
indicated that they find operators do not understand their core values (i.e. brand identity) and business
logic (i.e. low margins, focused on retaining customers in a defensive fashion). Combined with bad
experiences in collaborative platform projects in the past, these observations explain why banks are
reluctant to be dependent on operators and therefore opt for none SIM based solutions.
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Conclusions

This paper shows the complexity of factors that influence decision making of stakeholders about
where to locate the SE for mobile payment. From a technical perspective, SIM-based SE appears to be
superior to embedded and cloud-based SE in terms of security as well as performance traits. While
most respondents expect cloud-based SE to evolve and improve in the future, currently SIM-based
authentication is considered more secure, more reliable and less prone to identity fraud. Despite these
straightforward results, the interviews clearly indicate that stakeholders are in much doubt on which
SE solution to choose. Banks and service providers are experimenting with all three technical
alternatives for locating the SE, and several interviewees indicate their doubt on what to choose or
recommend. As such, it must be that other factors than the pure technological traits are needed to
explain preferences of stakeholders for SIM-based versus embedded and cloud-based SE.
In this paper, we attempt to elicit a wide range of factors rather than to make inferential claims on
commonly shared opinions among stakeholders. Although we had only twelve interviewees, we did
find similar patterns in the interviews, indicating a certain degree of saturation. A limitation of the
paper is that we treated the cloud-based models as one single group, and did not differentiate between
the approaches from Google versus Apple. Future research could take a more fine-grained perspective
and differentiate how stakeholders perceive the different models.
A validity threat could be bias towards interviewee’s business interests. We did find that,
unsurprisingly, operators were generally more favorable about SIM-based solutions than other groups
of respondents. At the same time, especially the discourse of the operators showed several fragments
of what might be touted wishful thinking or at least insufficiently justified claims. By incorporating
the perspectives of banks as well as external industry experts, we ensured a diversity of perspectives.
In our future research, we will nevertheless address this validity issue by triangulating the findings in
this paper with those in other studies where we used analytical hierarchy processing as well as
correlational studies. Such more confirmatory approaches will also help to prioritize the broad set of
factors that were elicited in the current exploratory study.
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